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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Low-income countries (LICs) as a group have enjoyed relatively rapid growth in recent 
years. Since 1995, for example, sub-Saharan Africa has grown faster than developed 
countries, after many years of poor average performance (IMF, 2008 and Collier et al, 
2008). This growth has not been sufficient to put LICs on the path to meeting most of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but it has reduced poverty and supported better 
health and education outcomes in many countries (IMF-World Bank, 2010). 
Estimates for 2009 suggest that the global financial crisis had already substantially 
slowed growth in most developing countries, thrusting millions back into poverty and 
setting back efforts to achieve the MDGs. If, in addition, the crisis has longer-run 
implications, that is, if it knocks countries off their track of solid medium-long-term 
growth, it will be a much greater disaster. The question is especially pressing insofar as 
the growth resurgence since the mid-1990s has been associated with generally supportive 
external conditions: strong global growth, stable or rising commodity prices, and 
increasing inflows of external capital. Thus, in considering the implications and policy 
response to the current crisis, it is important to consider the risks to sustaining medium-
term growth. 
In principle, a temporary negative shock to external demand or the terms of trade in a 
standard neoclassical growth model would be followed by a quick reversion to the steady 
state level of income, implying a growth ‘bounce-back’ and benign transitory effects. 
However, history is not very optimistic that LICs can uniformly escape global shocks 
without absorbing long-lasting damage to both growth and welfare.
 2 Over the past few 
decades, a LIC’s growth rate in one decade has generally been a poor predictor of its 
growth rate during the next decade, while many policies and country characteristics are 
more stable (Easterly et al, 1993). One influential view is that, as Easterly et al. put it: 
‘shocks, especially shocks to the terms of trade, are an important determinant of growth 
over 10-year periods, and that they can help account for low [growth] persistence.’ 
An emerging empirical literature has also shown that growth down-breaks, or periods of a 
severe growth slowdown, are more common than previously thought and are crucial in 
understanding the medium- to long-run growth process in LICs.
3 A related literature 
shows that countries that suffered spells of real income stagnation were more likely to be 
poor (see e.g., Reddy and Minoiu, 2009). Moreover, we know that crises can result in 
sharp declines in investment in education and health, declines that can potentially have 
long-lasting effects (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Krueger and Lindah, 2001). Finally, 
there is an extensive theoretical literature that explores the possibility of growth 
nonlinearities that may result in LICs falling into prolonged periods of underdevelopment, 
                                                 
2 Notable contributions on the effects of shocks in LICs include Collier, Goderis, and Hoeffler (2006), and 
Collier and Goderis (2009, 2010). 
3 See e.g., Rodrik (1999), Pritchett (2000), Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005), Hausmann, Rodríguez, 
and Wagner (2006), Gupta, Pattillo, and Carey (2006), and Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2008).  4 
 
commonly known as poverty traps. Nonlinearities in growth have been highly influential 
in shaping the thinking of both growth theorists and empiricists in recent years. The work 
on multiple-growth regimes and the world income distribution suggests that there may be 
growth factors strong enough to overcome the decreasing marginal productivity of the 
neoclassical production function, thereby producing persistent underdevelopment and 
income divergence across countries.
4 
Whether there will be a persistent negative growth effect of the crisis on LICs depends 
crucially on the nature of the shock, its transmission mechanism, and the policy response. 
For example, is the shock transmission mechanism the same as in the emerging markets 
and advanced economies? How does its dynamic path compare to previous global crises? 
The growth effect will also be a function of country-specific characteristics; that is, the 
ability of a country to absorb the shock quickly based on sound market fundamentals, 
favorable initial conditions, structural reforms and prudent procyclical policies. 
Transmission mechanisms from the global crisis shock seem to vary considerably across 
countries. Advanced economies have primarily suffered a financial/banking crisis, and 
much ongoing research is devoted to understanding this type of shock. Most developing 
countries were primarily hit by an external demand (ED) effect, although some, notably 
fuel exporters, were also hit by a terms of trade (TOT) and perhaps to a lesser extent a 
foreign direct investment (FDI) effect.
5 From a methodological point of view, this 
difference is quite important because these external shocks are more familiar to LICs than 
the financial shock is to advanced countries, therefore more credibly permitting a 
historical analysis of the effects in LICs. 
This paper puts the current crisis in historical perspective and examines the prospects for 
medium- to long-run growth in LICs. Although the uncertainties are enormous, and the 
amount of light that recent history can shed is limited, conditional answers are possible. 
In the analysis that follows, we focus on ED, TOT and FDI as the three main transmission 
mechanisms of the crisis impacting LICs, although FDI data are a constraining factor. 
The analysis will be based on a collection of exercises, each tackling the question at hand 
from a slightly different angle. The first is a simple event study in which we illustrate the 
growth paths of past crises and compare these to outcomes and projections for the current 
crisis. The second and third exercises focus on the medium-run effects of the crisis. 
Specifically, we employ an impulse-response method, followed by an analysis based on 
5-year growth panel regressions. We view these two approaches as complementary. 
While regression analysis is the traditional gold standard in hypothesis testing especially 
                                                 
4 See the edited book by Bowles, Durlauf, and Hoff (2006), and the Handbook of Economic Growth 
Chapter by Azariadis and Stachurski (2007) for literature review, and more specifically the debt trap model 
in Kehoe and Levine (1993).  
5 Although changes in remittances could be another possible transmission mechanism, their effect during 
the global economic crisis were quite mixed; while remittances decrease in some countries, they increased 
in some others (a notable example is Pakistan where the increase was substantial). Moreover, their likely 
endogeneity to recipient-country events is difficult to handle. 5 
 
using cross-country data, panel regressions may not fully capture the considerable 
variation in the data across time. Employing impulse response functions to examine the 
recovery from shocks makes full use of the within-country variation. Our last exercise is 
concerned with the longer-run implications of the crisis, using recently-developed 
methods to capture possible sharp structural down-breaks in growth rates. 
II.   PAST AND CURRENT GLOBAL SHOCKS 
The first exercise compares the growth experiences of LICs with those of the rest of the 
world economy, in past global crises. In particular, we consider three past global crises—
1975, 1982 and 1991—and the current crisis, 2009. Current projections imply a more 
rapid recovery of growth in LICs than has been experienced in past global crises. 
Compared to past global crises, the current crisis is distinguished by the severity of the 
downturn (Berg et al., 2010) and the synchronization between LICs and global cyclical 
growth movement (Imbs, 2010). 
In past global crises, LICs have tended to recover more slowly than the rest of the world 
(Figure 1, top panel). However, the current WEO forecasts imply a more rapid V-shaped 
recovery path out of the recession compared to previous crises. It could be that the 
different nature of the shocks faced by LICs in the current crisis is consistent with a more 
rapid recovery. A companion paper (Berg et al. 2010) looks more specifically at the 
plausibility of 2010-2011 forecasts, from the perspective of a relatively high frequency 
regression model. Here, we explore some of the medium- and long-term issues that frame 
the question. 
Next, we compare the TOT and ED growth effects of past global crisis (Figure 1, bottom 
panel). TOT growth is defined as growth of terms of trade for goods while ED growth is 
defined as trade partner real GDP growth weighted by exports to all partner countries.
6 It 
is notable that, unlike in previous crises where TOT growth moved sharply downward 
relative to ED growth, in the current crisis it is ED that has resoundingly declined, while 
TOT growth continued at around the historical average rate. This transmission channel is 
also highlighted in IMF (2009a) and more formal growth regression analysis in Berg et al. 
(2010). The evidence below, however, is that like TOT shocks, ED shocks also have 
sharply negative short-to-medium-term output effects.
7 
                                                 
6 An alternative definition weighing for trade shares was considered but not used as it drastically reduced 
our sample size, rendering most exercises imprecisely estimated. 
7 FDI data were not sufficient to produce a similar plot. 6 
 
Figure 1. GDP per Capita, TOT and ED Growth in Past and Current Crises 



























Note:The figure plots the average per capita GDP growth in the world and in LICs 5 years before and 5 years after
the global crises of 1975, 1982 and 1991. Also, shown are WEO projections until 2013. 
  




















Figure 4b: Terms-of-trade and external-demand growth in LICs in past and current crises
LIC Average TOT
LIC Current TOT (2009)
LIC TOT (2009) Projected
LICs External Demand (3 crises)
LICs External Demand (2009)
LICs External Demand (2009) Projected
Note:The figure plots the average terms-of-trade and external-demand growth in LICs 5 years before and 5 years after
the global crises of 1975, 1982 and 1991. Also, shown are WEO projections until 2013. 
 
Note: The top panel plots the average per capita GDP growth in the world and in LICs while the bottom 
panel plots the TOT and ED growth in LICs 5 years before and 5 years after the global crises (centered at 
zero on the horizontal axis) of 1975, 1982 and 1991, and the current crisis. Also shown in dashed lines are 
WEO projections until 2013. 7 
 
 
III.     GROWTH IN THE MEDIUM-TERM: AN IMPULSE-RESPONSE ANALYSIS 
What happens to output over the medium term following TOT and ED shocks? Does the 
path of output per capita remain below its pre-crisis trend and if so for how long? Do 
growth rates recover to their pre-crisis levels as suggested by the neoclassical growth 
models or could shocks derail growth permanently? Until recently, the emphasis on the 
medium term growth impact of shocks has been limited, with the notable exceptions of 
Boyd, Kwak, and Smith (2005) and Cerra and Saxena (2008). With the current crisis, 
interest in the topic has surged. For instance, Chapter 4 of the Fall 2009 World Economic 
Outlook concentrated on medium-term developments following financial crises in 
advanced, emerging, and developing economies over the past 40 years.
8 
In our second exercise we employ impulse-response-function analysis, which involves 
using an autoregressive model of output growth rates augmented by crisis dummies, as in 
Cerra and Saxena (2008).
 9 Using panel data for a broad set of developed and developing 
countries, Cerra and Saxena documented that political and financial crises (i.e., wars, 
banking or currency crises) are not typically followed by high-growth recovery phases, 
either immediately following the trough, over several years of the subsequent expansion, 
or even over the complete expansion that follows a recession. Thus, when output drops 
following crises, it tends to remain well below its previous trend. 
Using data from a panel of LICs we examine whether TOT and ED shocks have 
historically been associated with severe output losses and whether such output losses have 
been persistent. Specifically, we test the statistical relationship between growth and TOT 
and ED shocks by estimating a univariate autoregressive model in growth rates, which 
accounts for the nonstationarity of output and serial correlation in growth rates. The 
impulse response functions to each shock are shown with a one-standard-error band 
drawn from a thousand Monte Carlo simulations. The top and bottom panels in Figures 2a 
present impulse responses of output loss, measured as the percentage change from a linear 
growth trend, to a TOT shock and an ED shock, respectively.
10 
 
The key stylized facts that emerge from the analysis are as follows: The impact on output 
is negative and highly persistent under both types of shock. The medium-term output 
losses following ED shocks are particularly substantial. Output losses continue to rise 
without a sign of a reversal even 7 years after an ED shock, mounting to a cumulative loss 
of over 6 percent of GDP. As indicated by the dashed lines measuring the 90 percent 
confidence band, the average decline relative to trend is statistically significant. The 
                                                 
8 IMF (2009b), Furceri and Mourougane (2009) and Pisani-Ferry and van Pottelsberghe (2009) also look at 
the medium-term output effects of banking crises for different subsamples or case studies.   
9 Daniel Leigh very helpfully provided his Stata code and invaluable input.  
10 The shock dummy variables for TOT and ED are defined as the crisis periods that belong to the left tail 
of the TOT and ED growth distributions, respectively. The left tail is based on a one standard deviation of 
the sample that excludes extreme values (below the 1
st and above the 99
th percentiles), to mitigate the 
effects from measurement error. Results are qualitatively similar to two alternative shock definitions 
considered. 8 
 
output-loss path eventually becomes flat as growth tends to eventually return to the pre-
crisis rate, but after a decade of lower growth and a substantial loss of output. 
This may seem at first a surprising result given the neoclassical growth model’s 
prediction of rebound to the steady state. However, it is broadly consistent with similar 
impulse responses to different types of shocks (e.g., financial crises, Fall 2009 WEO; 
political crises, Cerra and Saxena, 2008). Although the mechanisms under which such 
output loss could persist after an ED shock merit careful consideration and future 
research, a reasonable hypothesis is the plausible interactions between ED shocks and 
private and public investment decisions or policy responses. For example an ED shock 
could result in a drastic shift in public investment from tradable goods to non-tradable 
goods or a policy change to reduce exposure to trade. 
We replicate the impulse response analysis for Sub-Sahara African (SSA) countries given 
special interest in how the crisis may be affecting this region.
11 As shown in Figure 2b the 
main results obtained from the LIC sample extend to SSA. One notable difference is that 
TOT shocks seem to have had a larger and more persistent effect than ED shocks in SSA, 
relative to the rest of LICs. This may be due to the fact that many countries in SSA are 
commodity and particularly fuel exporters and therefore more prone to TOT shocks. 
It is important to note that a key assumption of the Cerra-Sexana VAR method is that 
countries will eventually return to the pre-crisis growth trends. To examine whether this is 
a reasonable assumption for our analysis we plot histograms for TOT and ED reporting 
average growth for five years following a crisis relative to the pre-crisis trend. Figure 3 
confirms that mean reversion is a reasonable assumption as the median of LICs 
considered in these exercises tends to revert back to its pre-existing growth trend in the 5 
years following the shock.
12 There exists considerable variation around the median change 
in the five-year growth rate, with some countries topping their pre-crisis growth trends 
and others ending up with substantially lower growth. 
                                                 
11 The impulse response analysis was also performed using several other subsamples, including all non-
advanced countries, non-LICs, commodity- and non-commodity exporters.  
12 Of course, the maintained assumption that growth eventually returns does not drive how long it will take, 
or whether it bounces back so that it is temporarily above trend. The above results speak to those questions. 9 
 
 
Figure 2a. Impulse Response of Output Loss in LICs to TOT and ED Shocks 
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Note 1: Number of countries: 77; Number of observations: 3648
Note 2: Crisis episode was calculated using left tail of the distribution
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Years after the shock
Note 1: Number of countries: 77; Number of observations: 3648
Note 2: Crisis episode was calculated using left tail of the distribution
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Response of Change in Loss Output to External Demand
 
 
Note: The top and bottom panels present impulse responses of output loss in LICs, measured as the 
percentage change from a linear growth trend, to a TOT shock and an ED shock, respectively. The solid 




Figure 2b. Impulse Response of Output Loss in SSA to TOT and ED Shocks 
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Note 1: Number of countries: 37; Number of observations: 1757
Note 2: Crisis episode was calculated using left tail of the distribution
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SSA
Response of Change in Loss Output to Terms of trade
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Years after the shock
Note 1: Number of countries: 37; Number of observations: 1757
Note 2: Crisis episode was calculated using left tail of the distribution
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SSA
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Note: The top and bottom panels present impulse responses of output loss in SSA, measured as the 
percentage change from a linear growth trend, to a TOT shock and an ED shock, respectively. The solid 
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Note:  Histograms report five-year average growth ending in t+5 relative to pre-crisis trend, where crisis 
begins at period t.- 
 
 
This raises the question of whether, at least for some important subset of countries, the 
stationarity assumption for the growth rate is violated. We return to that question in the 
final section, when we look for breaks in growth. 
IV.   GROWTH IN THE MEDIUM-TERM: PANEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
While the impulse response analysis allowed us to examine the dynamic effects of 
shocks, we are also interested in the medium-term average effects of shocks in a 
framework that allows for an extended set of variables including, for example, policy 
interactions. Therefore, next we employ 5-year panel growth regressions as an alternative 
approach to investigating the impact of shocks on medium-term per capita GDP growth.
13 
In particular, our estimation results are based on panel GMM regressions in which the 
main explanatory variables are the three shocks: the change in ED, the change in TOT, 
and the change in the ratio of FDI to GDP. Other controls include the lagged output 
growth and a full set of country- and year-specific fixed effects. The full sample covers 
87 non-advanced economies, including 
both LICs and MICs. The sample excludes fuel-exporters since these countries’ growth 
experience has been heavily influenced by external demand for fuel commodities. 
Although omitted variable bias is a source of concern in most cross-country regression 
estimation, it is less so under our regression specification. This is because we are happy to 
assign to our shock variables any of their variation that is correlated with Barro/Solow-
type variables (which we do implicitly by omitting the latter variables) on the grounds 
that our shock variables are plausibly exogenous to other omitted growth determinants, 
                                                 
13 A similar estimation methodology was followed by Drummond and Ramirez (2009). 12 
 
such as policies, institutions, investment rates, and so on, at least at the sorts of horizon of 
interest to us here.
14 
Results are presented for ‘All’ non-advanced non-fuel countries, non-fuel LICs, and non-
fuel non-LICs (Table 3). The comparison is intended to provide some insights regarding 
the differential effects of these shocks in LICs and middle-income countries. 
Table 1. Panel GMM Growth Regressions 
Variables All LICs NonLICs All LICs NonLICs All LICs NonLICs
Lagged Growth -0.245***-0.216*** -0.217** -0.610*** -0.524*** -0.683*** -0.269*** -0.197** -0.079
Lagged Growth (0.061) (0.077) (0.089) (0.106) (0.100) (0.173) (0.056) (0.080) (0.053)
Growth in Terms of Trade 0.103** 0.098 0.096*** 0.030 0.028 0.044 0.136** 0.148** 0.187***
Growth in Terms of Trade (0.044) (0.060) (0.027) (0.028) (0.045) (0.027) (0.059) (0.071) (0.037)
Growth in External Demand 2.050***1.843*** 2.177*** 0.667** 0.670 0.421 1.958*** 1.340** 1.879***
Growth in External Demand (0.281) (0.471) (0.242) (0.316) (0.598) (0.295) (0.295) (0.525) (0.270)
Lagged Change in (FDI/GDP) 0.668*** 0.308 0.965*** 0.451 -0.486 1.464*** 0.725*** 0.664* 0.531**
Lagged Change in (FDI/GDP) (0.178) (0.216) (0.184) (0.631) (0.745) (0.437) (0.186) (0.345) (0.227)
Observations 522 281 241 178 92 86 344 189 155
Number of countries 87 48 39 85 47 38 87 48 39
Before 1989 After 1989 Entire time period
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. All specifications were estimated by panel data with year fixed effects, and 5 year averages over 1979-
2009. 
 
For the nonfuel LICs subsample, the coefficient estimate on ED growth is positive and 
highly significant, indicating a positive impact on medium-term growth (Table 1, column 
2). While the coefficient estimates on TOT and FDI for LICs using the entire time period 
in our sample are insignificant, they are highly significant for the entire sample and for 
non-LICs along with the coefficient estimates for ED (columns 1 and 3, respectively). 
Columns 4-9 present results from splitting the sample into the periods before and after 
1989 (the median year in our sample). Coincidentally, growth increased dramatically for 
the period after 1989 in most LICs. It is interesting to note that most of the effect of TOT 
and ED growth for LICs has been driven by variation in the period after 1989 (see 
columns 5 and 8). Even more notable is that in the post-1989 sample the FDI coefficient 
                                                 
14 Our approach makes much more sense for low-income countries than for others. One reason is that, for 
advanced countries, we might worry that common shocks (such as global shocks to productivity growth) 
could produce co-movements in output not driven by trade linkages. Clearly, this is a risk in our context as 
well. However, given that trade between low-income countries is relatively unimportant, the common 
shocks that would be problematic would be those that jointly affect rich and poor countries but are not 
mediated through output, the terms of trade, or FDI flows (which we also control for). These shocks would 
seem to be unlikely. 13 
 
becomes positive and significant.
15 This may not be surprising given that FDI flows to 
LICs have become sizable only in the last decade or so.
16 
Next, we ask the question, how does the projected average annual per capita growth 
obtained from using our coefficient estimates from the regression analysis presented in 
Table 1 compare with the actual WEO growth projections?
17 Given that most of the effect 
of TOT and ED growth for LICs has been driven by variation in the post-1989 period, we 
use the coefficient estimates based on the period 1989-2009 (Table 1, column 8), to 
produce a projection for average growth for the period 2010-2014.
18 We calculated our 5-
year growth regression based projections for 2010-2014 to be 3.3 percent per year, which 
matches exactly the WEO’s projection for the same period. Our projected growth 
highlights that WEO’s medium-run projected recovery path out of the recession is par to 
the recent historical patterns, as suggested by our regression analysis. 
We now investigate how macroeconomic policies may amplify or moderate the effects of 
shocks on growth. We first present simple illustrations of the bivariate relationship 
between a select sample of policy variables prior to the shock and GDP growth 5 years 
after the shock, giving the data a chance to speak with the minimum of auxiliary 
assumptions. This analysis is then extended to a multivariate regression analysis in which 
we interact the policy variables with the shock variables TOT, ED and FDI. Figures 4a 
and 4b plot pre-crisis government balance-to-GDP ratio, debt-to-GDP ratio, exchange-
rate regime, and international reserves accumulation (measured in months of imports) 
against post-crisis growth, where the former variables are calculated as the average over 
the 5 years preceding the crisis and the later as the annual average GDP per capita growth 
over the 5 years following the crisis. 
The top set of plots (left ED, right TOT) in Figure 4a show evidence of a positive, albeit 
weak, correlation between government balance and medium-run post-crisis growth, 
implying that countries with higher government deficits prior to a TOT or ED shocks 
experience slower growth in the aftermath. The bottom set of plots from the top present a 
negative relationship between the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio over the five preceding 
the crisis year, and the subsequent 5-year annual growth rate. This suggests that countries 
that build more debt in the run-up to the crisis tend to have lower medium-term post-crisis 
                                                 
15 This result is consistent with Dabla-Norris et al. (2010) who focus on the effects of FDI on LICs. 
16 We have checked the robustness of these results to alternative specifications and subsamples. Using trade 
weighted TOT and ED shocks reduced our sample by more than 30 percent rendering most coefficient 
estimates imprecisely estimated. Furthermore, to consider concerns regarding the unreliability of FDI data 
in LICs due to measurement error, we examined and confirmed robustness of our TOT and ED results by 
dropping the FDI shock from the baseline regressions. 
17 Given our five-year-panel structure, we cannot readily ask whether the crisis of 2008/2009 would have 
been well forecast by our regression. This question is better addressed in a shorter-horizon framework, as in 
Berg et al. (2010). 
18 Predicted growth is calculated as the sum of the contributions of the four regressors (lagged growth, 
external demand, terms of trade, and lagged difference in FDI/GDP).  To calculate the contribution for each 
variable, we multiply the regression coefficient by the WEO predicted average growth of each of the four 
regressors.  14 
 
growth. This finding is evident under both ED and TOT shocks. The top set of plots in 
Figure 4b shows the relationship between a measure of the flexibility of the exchange rate 
regime (‘1’ corresponds to fixed- and ‘5’ corresponds to flexible-exchange-rate regime) 
and medium-term growth. In this case too, there is some evidence that a more flexible 
exchange regime is associated with higher medium-term growth after a TOT shock. A 
positive but weaker relationship also exists under ED shocks. Finally, the bottom set of 
plots illustrates that the level of international reserves prior to either TOT or ED shocks 
does not seem to have much of an effect on GDP growth in the medium run, at least in the 
bilateral relationship presented. 
Some of these bivariate results—in themselves only suggestive—hold up in a multivariate 
regression context. In what follows we extend the analysis using multivariate growth 
regressions in which interaction terms between shocks and the four policy variables are 
included. We focus our discussion on interactions with the ED shock, seemingly the 
primary shock impacting LICs in the 2007-2009 global crisis. Table 2, column 2 presents 
the results of an interaction regression specification in which the government balance-to-
GDP ratio is interacted with the three shock variables. The coefficient estimate capturing 
the direct effect of this variable on growth obtains the expected sign but it is not 
statistically significant. More importantly though, the interaction term with an ED shock 
is negative and significant implying that countries with lower deficits may be better 
equipped to dampen some of the effects of the shock on growth. 
Next we incorporate an interaction term of the shocks with the debt-to-GDP ratio in the 
regression specification and find that, consistent with theory, the interacted term’s 
coefficient estimate is positive and significant (Table 2, Column 5). This suggests that 
accumulation of large debt-to-GDP ratios could amplify the effects of ED shocks on 
growth. For the exchange rate regime variable, the direct effect on growth obtains a 
negative but insignificant coefficient estimate (Column 8). The coefficient estimate on the 
interaction with ED is positive (but not precisely estimated), consistent with the 
hypothesis that more flexible exchange rate regimes can buffer the effects of an ED shock 
on growth. Finally, there is a positive and large direct effect of international reserves on 
growth (Column 11). More importantly, the interaction coefficient estimate is negative 
(significant at the 14 percent level) which implies that countries with a higher stock of 
reserves are more capable of reducing the effects of an ED shock on growth. We also 
used the four interaction specifications to recalculate the 5-year growth projections for 
2010-2014 obtaining values slightly lower but not statistically different from the WEO 
projections. 
In summary, the regression results reinforce the impulse response findings showing 
economically significant effects of TOT and ED shocks on growth in the post-1989 
period, consistent with most literature that emphasizes that LICs pushed for reforms to 
liberalize their economies starting in the early to mid-1990s. Regression results also show 
that FDI shocks played a significant role on growth. Annual average growth projections 
for 2010-2014 based on our regression coefficient estimates match closely the WEO 
projections. Finally, we have investigated interaction effects between our three shocks 
and several policy variables. Both an illustrative bivariate and a multivariate regression 15 
 
analysis provide evidence that lower budget deficits, lower debt, more flexible exchange 
rate regimes, and higher international reserves help LICs to dampen the effects of an ED 
shock on medium-term growth. 
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Note: Pre-crisis debt was calculated as the difference between t-5 and t, where t is the crisis year. Post-crisis growth is the 
annual GDP per capita growth over the 5 years after the crisis. 16 
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Note: Pre-crisis reserves were calculated as the difference between t-5 and t, where t is the crisis year. Post-crisis growth is 
the annual GDP per capita growth over the 5 years after the crisis. 17 
 
 
Table 2. Panel GMM Growth Regressions with Interactions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables All LICs NonLICs All LICs NonLICs All LICs NonLICs All LICs NonLICs
Lagged Growth -0.596***-0.284*** -0.092** -0.112* 0.055 -0.062 -0.353*** -0.326*** -0.170*** -0.337*** -0.279*** -0.190***
Lagged Growth (0.067) (0.077) (0.037) (0.059) (0.070) (0.052) (0.067) (0.082) (0.056) (0.057) (0.089) (0.054)
Growth in Terms of Trade 0.126*** -0.013 0.154*** 0.129 0.028 0.234*** 0.084 0.095 0.069 -0.029 -0.078 0.109
Growth in Terms of Trade (0.042) (0.063) (0.053) (0.089) (0.116) (0.060) (0.077) (0.086) (0.084) (0.048) (0.053) (0.106)
Growth in External Demand 0.731* -0.244 0.653* 0.928*** -0.584 0.350 2.065*** 1.739*** 2.374*** 1.855*** 1.295** 2.127***
Growth in External Demand (0.400) (0.267) (0.346) (0.325) (0.356) (0.623) (0.369) (0.577) (0.292) (0.275) (0.507) (0.390)
Lagged Change in (FDI/GDP) -2.257 0.098 0.405 0.361 -1.219** -0.398 -0.291 -0.373 1.608** 0.838 2.046* 0.382
Lagged Change in (FDI/GDP) (1.390) (0.336) (0.405) (0.348) (0.521) (0.453) (0.529) (0.658) (0.756) (0.521) (1.093) (0.828)
Central government balance over GDP (1 lag) -0.263* 0.200 0.523***
Central government balance over GDP (1 lag) (0.141) (0.152) (0.144)
Growth in Terms of Trade * lagged government balance over GDP 0.005 -0.006 -0.001
Growth in Terms of Trade * lagged government balance over GDP (0.005) (0.011) (0.005)
Growth in external demand * lagged government balance over GDP 0.077** -0.065** -0.129***
Growth in external demand * lagged government balance over GDP (0.031) (0.032) (0.040)
Lagged Change in (FDI/GDP) * lagged government balance over GDP -0.465** -0.012 -0.017
Lagged Change in (FDI/GDP) * lagged government balance over GDP (0.229) (0.045) (0.017)
Debt over GDP (1 lag) 0.014 -0.000 -0.078
Debt over GDP (1 lag) (0.014) (0.015) (0.057)
Growth in Terms of Trade * Debt over GDP (lag 1) -0.001* -0.000 -0.001
Growth in Terms of Trade * Debt over GDP (lag 1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Growth in external demand * Debt over GDP (lag 1) 0.000 0.006* 0.016
Growth in external demand * Debt over GDP (lag 1) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014)
Lagged Change in (FDI/GDP) * Debt over GDP (lag 1) -0.001 0.008* 0.010**
Lagged Change in (FDI/GDP) * Debt over GDP (lag 1) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Exchange rate regime (fixed=1 floating =0) 0.774 -1.429 1.919
Exchange rate regime (fixed=1 floating =0) (1.791) (2.662) (1.405)
Growth in Terms of Trade * Exchange rate regime 0.060 -0.009 0.076
Growth in Terms of Trade * Exchange rate regime (0.097) (0.130) (0.099)
Growth in external demand * Exchange rate regime -0.067 0.286 -0.147
Growth in external demand * Exchange rate regime (0.480) (0.708) (0.372)
Lagged Change in (FDI/GDP) * Exchange rate regime 1.365** 1.277 -0.827
Lagged Change in (FDI/GDP) * Exchange rate regime (0.689) (1.151) (0.949)
Reserves 5.768*** 7.192*** 2.428
Reserves (1.676) (2.765) (4.477)
Growth in Terms of Trade * Reserves 0.118*** 0.167 -0.029
Growth in Terms of Trade * Reserves (0.045) (0.128) (0.103)
Growth in external demand * Reserves -1.015** -1.111 0.076
Growth in external demand * Reserves (0.444) (0.766) (1.197)
Lagged Change in (FDI/GDP) * Reserves 0.206 -3.952 1.270
Lagged Change in (FDI/GDP) * Reserves (0.592) (2.919) (1.013)
Constant -1.631 1.275 1.259 -3.202*** 2.466* 3.134 -6.714*** -7.084*** -6.710*** -6.369*** -4.320** -6.790***
Constant (1.320) (1.425) (1.195) (1.150) (1.372) (2.529) (1.398) (2.007) (1.242) (1.069) (2.047) (1.713)
Observations 125 161 137 275 137 138 213 108 105 212 109 103
Number of countries 65 43 37 78 39 39 75 38 37 81 44 37
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
and 5 year averages over 1989-2009. 
V.   GROWTH IN THE LONGER-RUN: GROWTH DOWN-BREAKS ANALYSIS 
The second and third exercises above were designed to examine the response of growth 
over the medium term. Our last approach looks at longer-run possible implications of the 18 
 
crisis. Both previous approaches implicitly assume that the growth process itself is not 
affected by the shock. In other words, it is assumed that growth will return to its pre-crisis 
trend in the medium run. The previous analysis does not focus on what is perhaps the 
most telling source of variation in the underlying growth data for LICs. As Easterly et al. 
(1993) first pointed out, growth performance tends to be highly unstable, a ‘stop and go’ 
process. Only a few countries have experienced consistently high growth rates over 
periods of several decades. 
The more typical pattern is that countries experience phases of growth, stagnation, or 
decline of varying length (Pritchett 2000). As convincingly argued in Hausmann, 
Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005), ‘Standard growth theory, whether of the neoclassical or the 
endogenous variant, suggests that our best bet for uncovering the relation between growth 
and its fundamentals is to look for instances where trend growth experiences a clear 
shift.’ However, while output paths in the advanced countries tend to be reasonably 
steady, in developing countries they are often characterized by ‘mountains, cliffs, and 
plains’ (Pritchett, 2000). 
Next we present evidence from graphical analysis on the association between TOT and 
ED shocks and growth down-breaks. Growth down-breaks, broadly defined as extended 
periods of markedly slow growth, are a striking feature of the development process. 
Recent work by Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005), Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer 
(2008), and Jones and Olken (2008) use this new approach to understand the differential 
growth experiences of rich and poor countries.
19 In this section we use a set of growth 
down-breaks—identified by the econometric methodology of Berg et al.
20 for the period 
1960-2009—to examine whether growth decelerations are associated with TOT and ED 
shocks.
21 The exercises below examine possible associations between GDP growth 
decelerations (growth down-breaks) and TOT and ED shocks from two different angles. 
                                                 
19 Two early precursors of the current work on growth spells are Ben-David and Papell (1998), and Pritchett 
(2000), both of which employed novel econometric methods to identify shifts in growth performance. 
20 Berg et al. (2008) in turn follow Antoshin, Berg, and Souto (2008) 
 who identify ‘growth spells’ by 
modifying the procedure pioneered by Bai and Perron (1998) to determine sample-specific critical values, 
as is appropriate when the time dimension is 30 years or less. 
21 In Appendix II we list all the episodes of down-breaks in economic growth since 1960 that we are able to 
detect by using the aforementioned statistical methodology. 19 
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Shock is based in External demand growth diff - LICs
Growth breaks  Vs. Persistent shock
 
 
Note: The left panels plot the number of GDP growth down-breaks in a large sample of low-income 
countries (excluding transition economies) during the periods leading up to, and following, a large 
persistent terms of trade shock (year t+0 on the horizontal axis). The right panels convert the number of 
breaks to a conditional probability given the total number of down-breaks identified by our methodology. A 
large persistent TOT shock is defined as the worst 10 percent of the distribution of all TOT shocks, 
measured as the difference of the average 3 year TOT growth before and after period t. The right panel is 





First, we considered the number and conditional probability of growth down-breaks 
during the period leading up to, and following a major negative TOT or ED shock.
22 The 
idea here is to see whether GDP growth down-breaks coincide or follow large TOT and 
ED shocks (Figures 5a and 5b). One pattern that emerges from is that persistent negative 
TOT shocks have often coincided with growth down-breaks.
23 However, persistent 
negative ED shocks have shown no association with growth down-breaks. Why would 
persistent negative TOT shocks be more likely to have quasi-permanent negative effects 
on growth? One explanation is that countries that are hard-hit by TOT shocks find it 
difficult to adjust, even after a few years. The factors that have (usually) produced the 
commodities in question cannot easily switch to other uses, such as satisfying domestic 
demand or finding other export markets. Thus, the resulting decline in foreign income 
could squeeze imports and activity persistently, thus impeding productive activities 
throughout the economy. In contrast, adjustment to ED shocks may be less severe as 
resources could be directed more flexibly towards domestic demand. This remarkable 
observation suggests that if indeed the current crisis primarily has affected low-income 
countries through ED and not through TOT, there may be more reason for hope for a 
smoother recovery.
24 
Second, the top and bottom panels of Figures 6 plot the behavior of TOT and ED in the 
period leading up to, and following growth downturns (year 0 on the horizontal axis). 
This exercise differs from the previous one in that the main focus is on episodes of down-
breaks rather than episodes of large TOT or ED shocks. The idea here is to see whether 
there is any association between sharp decreases in GDP growth and growth of TOT and 
ED. Once again the pattern that emerges is that TOT growth tends to decrease sharply in 
the run-up to growth decelerations, providing suggestive evidence that sharp TOT growth 
declines may lead to a sustained period of slow growth. On the contrary, ED growth 
shows virtually no co-movement with a growth downturn. This observation is consistent 
with the previous exercise. 
                                                 
22 In our baseline we consider a large permanent shock defined as the 10 percent of the left tail of the 
distribution of all permanent shocks measured as the difference of the average 3 year TOT and ED growth 
before and after period t. We have also considered a large transitory shock – the 10 percent of the left tail of 
the distribution of the difference in annual TOT and ED growth. In addition we considered shocks that 
resemble the intensity of the current TOT and ED shocks (the difference of the growth in TOT and ED 
between 2007 and 2009).  For ED, given that the current shock is the largest that most LICs have seen in 
current history and therefore we could not identify more than a handful of such shocks in our sample, we 
considered lower intensity shocks by taking fractions of the current shock. For TOT we consider the 
intensity of the current shock which was quite mild in historical terms. Results using the last two alternative 
definitions of the shock are consistent with our baseline plots and are available upon request. 
23 This is consistent with the results of Berg et al. (2008) on terms of trade shocks and the ends of growth 
spells. 
24 The definitions of ‘persistent’ and ‘large’ can be found in the notes to the table. It turns out that large 
negative external demand shocks such as those experienced by many countries in 2009 are not 
unprecedented for many LICs. In the sample used for figure 5, there were 68 instances in which countries 
faced external demand shocks larger than they faced in 2009 (assuming WEO projections for the out-years). 21 
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Note: The top and bottom panels plot the behavior of TOT and ED, respectively, in the period leading up to, 
and following, growth downturns (year 0 on the horizontal axis) in LICs. 22 
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Note: The top and bottom panels plot the behavior of TOT and ED, respectively, in the period leading up to, 
and following, growth downturns (year 0 on the horizontal axis) in SSA. 23 
 
 
The results from the two exercises relating growth down-breaks with shocks were 
confirmed when the sample is restricted to SSA countries (Figure 7). One additional 
observation from this exercise is that the growth down-breaks experienced by SSA 
countries are sharper and seem to occur after a period of steady rise in growth. 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
Although the short-run growth prospects for emerging and developing countries appear to 
be positive (see Berg et al. 2010), there is still a question on the extent to which the 
current shock has longer-run implications that may knock LICs off their track record of 
solid medium-term growth. History is not encouraging that LICs can uniformly escape 
global shocks without absorbing long-lasting damage to growth and welfare. In past 
crises, it has often taken several years for LICs to bring growth rates back into positive 
territory. Could this be pattern be different in the 2009 global crisis? This paper has 
attempted to answer this question by several econometric methodologies to analyze 
historical data in a panel of countries. 
On the positive side, based on the history of growth decelerations, our results suggest that 
ED shocks are not associated with sharp declines in output growth. Given existing 
evidence that LICs were primarily impacted by such a shock, the exercise assigns a low 
probability that many LICs will suffer from persistently low growth due to the crisis. 
However, our impulse response analysis shows that there seem to be quite substantial and 
highly persistent output losses associated with TOT and ED shocks in the medium-run. 
Panel growth regressions re-enforced the impulse response findings that show 
economically significant effects of TOT, ED and FDI shocks in the medium-run. Finally, 
by using simple illustrations and by extending the regression analysis to include 
interaction terms we investigated how macroeconomic policies may amplify or moderate 
the effects of the three shocks on growth. It was shown that countries with lower budget 
deficits, lower debt, more flexible exchange rate regimes, and higher international 
reserves are more likely to dampen the effects of an ED shock on growth. 
These conclusions are too broad-brush to do more than inform country-specific policy 
recommendations. These empirical exercises are only rough guides to current 
circumstances. First, there has always been substantial heterogeneity in the response of 
countries’ growth to large negative terms of trade and external demand shocks, and it is 
important to avoid over-emphasizing average reactions to average shocks. Second, the 
current shock is different in many ways. Clearly there is a need for vigilance and prudent 
policy to prevent a protracted slowdown in some countries. Nonetheless, this paper 
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Appendix I. List of Countries and Subsamples used in the Quantitative Analysis 
           
   LICs  Non LICs    
   Afghanistan  Algeria *    
   Albania  Argentina    
   Angola *  Belarus    
   Azerbaijan *  Bosnia and Herzegovina    
   Bangladesh  Botswana    
   Benin  Brazil    
   Bolivia  Bulgaria    
   Burkina Faso  Chile    
   Burundi  China    
   Cambodia  Colombia    
   Cameroon  Costa Rica    
   Central African Republic  Croatia    
   Chad *  Dominican Republic    
   Congo, Dem. Rep. of  Ecuador *    
   Congo, Rep. *  Egypt, Arab Rep.    
   Côte d'Ivoire  El Salvador    
   Eritrea  Estonia    
   Ethiopia  Gabon *    
   Gambia, The  Guatemala    
   Georgia  Hungary    
   Ghana  Indonesia    
   Guinea  Iran, Islamic Rep. *    
   Guinea-Bissau  Jamaica    
   Haiti  Jordan    
   Honduras  Kazakhstan *    
   India  Kuwait *    
   Kenya  Latvia    
   Kyrgyz Republic  Lebanon    
   Lao PDR  Libya *    
          
   Note: All countries in sample are classified as LICs and     
  
non LICs. Non-fuel countries are marked with stars. The dataset 
used in this paper is available by the authors upon request. For a 
data appendix see Berg et al. (2010).    




Appendix I. List of Countries and Subsamples used in the Quantitative Analysis (cont.) 
          
   LICs  Non LICs    
   Lesotho  Lithuania    
   Madagascar  Macedonia    
   Malawi  Malaysia    
   Mali  Mauritius    
   Mauritania  Mexico    
   Moldova  Morocco    
   Mongolia  Namibia    
   Mozambique  Oman *    
   Myanmar  Panama    
   Nicaragua  Paraguay    
   Niger  Peru    
   Nigeria *  Philippines    
   Pakistan  Poland    
   Papua New Guinea  Romania    
   Rwanda  Russian Federation *    
   Senegal  Saudi Arabia *    
   Sierra Leone  Serbia    
   Sri Lanka  South Africa    
   Sudan *  Swaziland    
   Tajikistan  Syrian Arab Republic    
   Tanzania  Thailand    
   Togo  Trinidad and Tobago *    
   Uganda  Tunisia    
   Uzbekistan  Turkey    
   Vietnam  Turkmenistan *    
   Zambia  Ukraine    
      United Arab Emirates *    
      Uruguay    
      Venezuela *    
           
           
  
 
Note: All countries in sample are classified as LICs and        
  
non LICs. Non-fuel countries are marked with stars. The dataset 
used in this paper is available by the authors upon request. For a 
data appendix see Berg et al. (2010).    
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Appendix II. List of Down-breaks Episodes in our Sample 
 
country year country year country year
Albania 1988 Estonia 1990 Namibia 1981
Angola 1975 Estonia 2005 Nicaragua 1978
Armenia 1971 Gabon 1977 Nigeria 1972
Armenia 1990 Georgia 1990 Oman 1977
Armenia 2005 Guatemala 1981 Oman 1986
Azerbaijan 1974 Haiti 1982 Papua New Guinea 1975
Azerbaijan 1990 Haiti 1999 Paraguay 1982
Bangladesh 1973 Honduras 1969 Peru 1988
Bangladesh 1979 Hungary 1979 Philippines 1957
Belarus 1961 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1977 Philippines 1981
Belarus 1978 Jamaica 1973 Poland 1980
Belarus 1991 Jordan 1968 Romania 1989
Bolivia 1978 Jordan 1983 Russian Federation 1961
Botswana 1990 Kazakhstan 1974 Russian Federation 1975
Brazil 1981 Kazakhstan 1990 Russian Federation 1991
Bulgaria 1982 Kuwait 1996 Saudi Arabia 1982
Bulgaria 1990 Kyrgyz Republic 1971 Sierra Leone 1975
Burundi 1972 Latvia 1974 Sierra Leone 1995
Cameroon 1971 Latvia 1989 South Africa 1982
Cameroon 1987 Latvia 2005 Tajikistan 1990
Chile 1972 Libya 1969 Thailand 1997
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 1975 Lithuania 1974 Togo 1970
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 1990 Lithuania 1991 Trinidad and Tobago 1983
Costa Rica 1979 Lithuania 2005 Tunisia 1973
Croatia 1980 Macedonia, FYR 1980 Turkmenistan 1974
Croatia 1990 Macedonia, FYR 1990 Turkmenistan 1991
Côte d'Ivoire 1979 Mauritania 1972 Turkmenistan 2005
Ecuador 1974 Mexico 1982 Uganda 1970
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1979 Moldova 1974 Ukraine 1974
El Salvador 1979 Moldova 1991 Ukraine 1991
Eritrea 1995 Mongolia 1990 Uzbekistan 1974
Eritrea 2000 Mozambique 1975 Uzbekistan 1991
Eritrea 2001 Mozambique 1982 Zambia 1970
Estonia 1974 Myanmar 1986 Zimbabwe 1999
 
Note: Growth breaks are produced using the methodology developed in Souto, Antoshin, and Berg (2008) 
and subsequently used in Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2008). 
 